Prosecution Details

Being an employer, did not so far as is practicable provide and maintain a working environment in which the employees of the employer are not exposed to hazards contrary to sections 19(1) and 19A(3) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984

Introduction: The Offender, the Workplace and the Employee

On 13 January 2022, a Farm Manager suffered fatal injuries (Incident) when operating a BHB Autopower Wool Press (Wool Press).

The Incident occurred at a farm in Katrine (the Farm), which was a small-scale sheep and crop hobby farm owned by Mr Ashworth. Mr Ashworth operated the Farm as a sole trader trading as Culbarting Rural. The Farm was (and at the relevant time was) used for cropping as well as managing livestock (sheep), shearing their wool and processing the fleeces into ‘wool packs’.

At the time of the Incident, the Farm Manager was employed by Mr Ashworth in a permanent capacity as the Farm Manager. In this role, the Farm Manager had a central role in the day-to-day operations of the Farm. The Incident occurred within the Farm’s ‘Shearing Shed’, which housed several items of wool-processing plant, including the Wool Press.

The BHB Autopower Wool Press

The Wool Press was an item of plant that used a descending press plate (Press Plate) to compress sheep fleeces housed within a nylon bag that lined the interior of the press into a ‘wool pack’. Once sufficiently compressed and at the desired weight, the wool pack was removed from the Wool Press and the process was repeated, allowing large amounts of wool to be efficiently stored and easily distributed.

At the time of the Incident, the Wool Press was over 30 years old. There were no safety devices retro-fitted to the Wool Press. The electronic control box and associated buttons to activate the electro-hydraulic motor of the Wool Press were located on a separate component.

Sometime prior to December 2019, the Wool Press was procured by Mr Ashworth from another shearing contractor known to the Farm Manager. Farm Manager From the time of purchase until the Incident, the Wool Press was used at the Farm for approximately one week per year during the annual shearing period.

When the Press Plate was in its fully raised position, the unguarded intersection between the Press Plate and the body of the Wool Press (Pinch Point) was exposed to the operator.

The Wool Press automatically completed a full descension/ascension cycle after activation of the operating lever without the requirement to continue pushing and/or holding any of these respective components. More wool could be packed into the press once the Press Plate was raised again, or an operator could configure the Wool Press to lift an opening on the base section to eject the finished wool pack.

Prior to the Incident

From the morning of Monday 10 January 2022, until the Incident occurred on Thursday 13 January 2022 (Shearing Period), the Farm Manager was overseeing and supervising the shearing and wool processing occurring at the Farm.

Mr Ashworth was not present on the Farm during the entire Shearing Period. However, on 7 January 2022, Mr Ashworth and the Farm Manager had discussed the planning of the work to be completed during the Shearing Period as well as physically conducted prestart checks and a visual inspection of the Wool Press’ operating sequences. During the Shearing Period, only the Farm Manager and one other worker operated the Wool Press and it was in regular use during this time.

The Incident

From about 7.30am onwards on 13 January 2022, the Shearing Shed at the Farm was operational.

At about 9.00am, the Farm Manager ejected a full wool pack from the Wool Press. By unknown means, the Wool Press was activated while the Farm Manager’s upper body was between the Press Plate and the body of the Wool Press. The Press Plate descended, entrapping the Farm Manager within the Pinch Point, causing a fatal neck injury.

Knowledge of the Hazard

The hazard in this instance was an entrapment and crushing hazard caused by the Pinch Point between the descending Press Plate and the body of the Wool Press in the event of inadvertent activation (Hazard).

Prior to the Incident, the Commission for Occupational Safety and Health had published the Code of Practice: Safeguarding of Machinery and Plant 2009, which was approved by the Minister of Commerce under section 57 of the OSH Act. It states that in the absence of guarding, other risk mitigation strategies such as two-handed activation controls should be used to reduce the risk of an operator accessing dangerous parts while the plant is in operation (p. 22, 3.1.6).

In the absence of additional guarding with respect to the Pinch Point on the Wool Press, the risk of employees being exposed to the Hazard would have been reduced by the Wool Press having a feature that not only required the simultaneous activation of two-handed controls (i.e. the operating lever and button on the electronic control box) but with at least one of these controls requiring a continuous operator activation or ‘pushing' to facilitate movement.

 At the date of the Incident, it was reasonably practicable to have installed and maintained a function with the Wool Press in which the Press Plate could only lower with the simultaneous activation of two-control components and with the completion of an automatic cycle being contingent on a control component continuing to be activated / pressed.

The prosecution did not allege that Mr Ashworth’s failure caused the death of the Farm Manager. 

On 24 February 2026 the Magistrate issued a fine of $22,000 and ordered costs of $4861.00.